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Material Power or Normative Conflict: Determinants of the Interaction 





We witness a constant interaction of global and local forces in the 
global agrifood system. This paper develops an analytical framework 
for the identification of the relative impact of these global versus local 
forces on the sustainability of the agrifood system. In pursuit of its 
objectives, the framework highlights material and ideational sources of 
power as important determinants of how the contest between global and 
local actors and norms in global agrifood governance plays out. With 
this framework, the paper provides an integrating function for the panel. 
In addition, the paper will employ the framework in an empirical 
investigation of determinants of policies and practices regarding 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in India. GMO policies and 
practices represent a contested ground where (different) ‘local’ and 
‘international’ values clash, while at the same time, the discursive 
power of the biotech industry is highly visible. In consequence, the case 
of the commercial introduction of GMOs, and specifically the example 
of ‘Golden Rice’ in India, presents excellent evidence for the need to 
look beyond material sources of power and consider the ideational ones 
and their interaction with the material dimension, if one wants to 
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The sustainability of today’s global agrifood system is shaped by the interaction of 
global and local forces. These forces are of a material and ideational nature and result from 
agency by state and non-state actors as well as structural contexts. The resulting picture is a 
complex web of forces that makes it hard to grasp the interplay and conflicts of the involved 
powers. Which are the most powerful determinants of the sustainability characteristics of 
global agrifood production and consumption today?  
One of the major problems in the global agrifood system is its lack of sustainability. 
Global food security and safety are still distant goals. In 2009, 1020 million people were 
suffering from hunger (an increase of 97 million people from 2008) and 6 million people will 
have died from malnourishment according to FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization 2009). 
At the same time, even those who have enough to eat face health threats from unsafe food 
production methods, and today’s agricultural practices are associated with biodiversity loss, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and soil erosion and degradation to name just a few of the relevant 
environmental problems. The sustainability of the global agrifood system, then, is too 
important an issue for the question of its determinants to be neglected simply because they 
may be difficult to identify.  
In consequence, a comprehensive and systematic analytical framework is needed for 
investigating the interaction between the different global and local forces and their impact on 
the sustainability of today’s global agrifood system. This paper aims to develop such a 
framework. It does so in three steps. The paper will first describe the complex interaction 
between different types of global and local forces in the global agrifood system and its 
governance. In a second step, the paper will develop a framework to analyze power relations, 
allowing a comprehensive and systematic assessment of these forces. Thirdly, the paper will 
illustrate the empirical applicability of the framework in an investigation of determinants of 
policies and practices regarding genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in India, focusing on 
the example of ‘Golden Rice’. The concluding section will sum up the argument and discuss 
implications for science and politics. 
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Global and Local Forces in the Agrifood System 
The current agrifood system represents an increasingly globalized system of commercial 
trade, which pools a multitude of participating forces. Liberalization and globalization of 
agriculture and food have had tremendous impact on the organizational structure of the 
system, actor constellations and interaction within. Today, state as well as non-state actors at 
various levels of governance play a pivotal role in the governance of the global agrifood 
system. At the same time, a variety of norms including sustainability, efficiency and 
modernity, for instance, influence the governance of the agrifood system. Regarding both, 
actors and norms, importantly, we can observe an interaction and sometimes contest between 
global and local forces in the global agrifood system. 
The “logic of distancing” between the production and consumption of food is one major 
development closely associated with organizational and structural shifts of the global food 
system (Kneen 1995; Friedmann 1992). Today, a large variety of actors situated along global 
supply chains pursue their interest in the agrifood system and its governance and their 
activities determine the opportunities and constraints for a sustainability transformation of the 
system. Specifically, market concentration in food production, processing, retailing on the 
input side have fostered the rise of powerful agrifood corporations and the marginalization of 
small- and mid-size farming on the production side as well as small businesses on the retail 
side (Lang 2003). As a consequence, agrifood corporations, today, exercise substantial power 
in the governance of the global agrifood system, influencing public regulation in their interest, 
but just as importantly creating, implementing and enforcing self-set rules and standards as 
well (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Next to this rise of corporate actors in a globalized world, the 
traditional problem solving capacity of the state has rapidly decreased (Jessop 2008). Still, 
governments continue to play a pivotal role in global food governance due to their capacity to 
determine trade rules, agricultural subsidies or market access for GMOs and chemicals, for 
instance. Partly as a response to these developments, new social movements anxious about the 
environmental and social implications of the architecture of the current agrifood system try to 
influence its governance (MacMillan 2005). Moreover, local communities continue to play an 
important role in shaping the sustainability of the agrifood system (Scott et al. 2009). The 
established rules and norms, thus, often compete with new ones over authoritative legacy. 
The opaqueness of agrifood governance, which results from the interplay between 
various types of actors, is further enhanced by their activities at various levels of governance. 
Importantly, the different levels of governance cannot be assigned individually to different 
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types of actors. While one tends to think of agrifood corporations as global actors and civil 
society actors as representing the local level, reality is much more complex. This can be more 
easily observed in the case of civil society actors, where NGOs such as Greenpeace or Oxfam 
are known to pursue their goals and ideas across borders and at all levels of governance. 
Large business actors, however, can also come to play the role of ‘local actors’. In India, for 
instance, global retail chains have found it extremely difficult to get market access and Indian 
retail chains dominate the market. Even if the latter do not represent ‘local’ forces, as one 
would associate them with the village level, the role of such national or even regional (sub-
national) retail chains needs to be examined in the interplay of local and global forces. Public 
actors, of course, play a role at all levels of governance as well, from the local to the 
supranational level.  
Next to the complex interplay of global and local actors in the global agrifood system 
and its governance, a strong influence of a range of norms can be identified. Faced by 
increasing consumer awareness after various food scandals such as the discovery of BSE or 
dioxin scandals, public as well as private actors have stressed the need for improvements in 
agrifood governance in the interest of food safety (Phillips and Wolfe 2001). Simultaneously, 
public and private actors emphasize the lack of food security in many developing countries as 
a continuing sustainability deficit of the global food system. Both food safety and food 
security, in turn, depend on a range of sustainability characteristics of the agrifood system. 
The definition of the Sustainable Food Laboratory highlights the complexity of social and 
environmental aspects of sustainability in the food chain: 
“We define a sustainable food system as one in which resources (including natural resources such 
as soil and water, as well as human resources such as labor) are used at their rate of recovery. As a 
result, the fertility of our soil is maintained and improved; the availability and quality of water is 
protected and enhanced; biodiversity is healthy; farmers, farm workers, and all other actors along 
the supply chain have livable incomes; the food we eat is safe and promotes our health; businesses 
can thrive; and the carbon and energy footprints of production are within the limits scientists 
correlate with relative safety.” (Sustainable Food Laboratory) 
 
Yet, these different norms underlying governance in pursuit of a sustainable global 
agrifood system may well be at odds/conflict with each other, or impose different costs and 
benefits on different parts of the global population. Governance initiatives intended to 
improve food safety for consumers in the North, for instance, most prominently retail 
standards such as the GlobalGap, have been found to hold potentially disastrous implications 
for rural livelihoods in the South (Scott et al. 2009). Thus, perspectives on what constitute 
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sustainable food production and consumption practices may well differ in different societies 
and regions.  
Even more fundamentally, we can identify democratic ideals and market logic as two 
normative approaches contesting each other in global agrifood governance: 
“The history of food governance can usefully be understood as a long struggle between two 
conflicting forces: ’food democracy‘ and ’food control‘: the latter suggests relatively few people 
exerting power to shape the food supply; the policy framework is dirigiste; decisions are ’top-
down‘ […] ’Food democracy‘, on the other hand, gives scope for a more inclusive approach to 
food policy. Its ethos is ‘bottom-up’, considering the diversity of views and interests in the mass of 
the population and food supply chain […].” (Lang and Heasman 2004, 279) 
 
Again, however, while one might be inclined to associate the market logic in food governance 
with global actors and democratic ideals with the local level, both norms refuse such a simple 
dichotomy. After all, supra-national actors such as the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) or transnational civil society actors would tend to also claim democratic norms 
and/or practices for themselves. Likewise, local economic actors also try to maximize their 
control over market shares, profits, regulation and the associated distribution of rents.  
Both global and local actors and norms, then, seem to be influential factors in the 
governance of today’s global agrifood system. Importantly, they differ in their ability to 
exercise power and draw their influence from different sources. Global agrifood corporations, 
especially food retailers or agribiotech companies, have great material resources at disposal, 
which puts them in a potentially very influential position to impact political decisions. 
Likewise, the state still possesses considerable decision-making power due to its authority in 
national and international regulation of relevant policy areas. In contrast, civil society actors, 
especially local ones, tend not to command huge material resources, but their ability to 
influence political decisions is often enhanced by the public perception of them as legitimate 
political actors. At the same time, global and local business, state, and civil-society actors are 
embedded in a setting shaped not only by actor-specific sources of power, but also by forces 
existing at the structural level, such as market structures or societal norms and values. In 
consequence, agrifood governance cannot be easily ascribed to a causal chain between the 
exercise of power by a specific actor and a specific outcome, but needs to be considered in 
context of the interaction of different global and local sources and facets of power. Only an 
analysis systematically conceptualizing the multiple dimensions of power at play in the 
governance of the global agrifood system, then, is truly able to shed light on the role of global 
and local forces in it. 
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Analyzing Power Relations in the Global Agrifood System 
A theoretic framework for analyzing power relations and the role of global and local 
forces in the global agrifood system is faced by the problem that the existing theoretical 
approaches in International Relations (IR) theory have approached questions of power from 
fundamentally different perspectives. Specifically, realist and neoliberal institutionalist 
approaches have tended to focus on the exercise of power by actors, states in the case of 
realist approaches and state and non-state actors in the case of neoliberal institutionalist 
approaches. Critical and post-structuralist approaches, however, have highlighted the power 
of structures, for instance hegemonic blocs and discourses. Numerous scholars have criticized 
the theoretical limitations inherent in this agent-structure differentiation and call for an 
integrative framework that looks at the interaction and relation of different types of power. In 
this respect, Barnett and Duvall (2006) remind us of the frequently made distinction between 
the two possible ways power can be exercised: ‘Power over’ refers to actions, where actors 
are able to exercise control over others, while ‘power to’ points to social relations of 
constitution that define actors as well as their capacities and resources. This conceptual 
distinction is especially useful when looking at the diverse composition of the global agrifood 
system, where a sole focus on actors’ power hides the structural forces that influence an 
actor’s role and behavior. Simultaneously, a focus on the influences of structures would 
neglect the agency exercised by actors in shaping the system and its structures. The mutual 
constitution of social structures and actors in the global agrifood system, then, points to the 
benefits of a framework that distinguishes and integrates different dimensions of power. Such 
a perspective enables the analysis to include the relevant plethora of (in)visible forces and 
their interactions, as well as their sources of power.  
Here, we develop a framework that allows us to delineate that the meaning and effects 
of actions and structural influences depend heavily on their material or ideational nature. This 
framework emphasizes that actor-specific as well as structural power can be based on material 
sources such as the distribution of economic or technological resources or on ideational 
resources such as legitimacy or cultural embeddedness. In the following, we will demonstrate 
that it is crucial to identify these material and ideational dimensions of power in order to 
analyze the power of different global and local actors and norms and understand their 
interaction.  
According to some theoretical approaches in IR, material dimensions of power are 
considered to be the foundation of most political activities. Traditionally, IR theories, 
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specifically realist ones, considered primarily military means, i.e. arms and weapons, as 
material sources of power. This approach’s main focus was on state power, of course. From a 
broader perspective considering state and non-state actors, material power is made up of 
capabilities grounded in the economic realm such as modes of production, information, 
finance and technology as well. Taking material capabilities into account means to pay 
attention to the influence of changes in production and consumption processes on the power 
of actors. In consequence, this approach acknowledges the changing potential influence of 
actors due to globalization processes and similar major socio-economic transformations. 
Material capabilities influence actors’ strategies and interests and build the material 
conditions for their actions in certain policy fields. In other words, material resources define 
the behavioral options of actors both on the input and output side of the political processes 
(Fuchs 2007). 
However, material resources only have limited explanatory power as long as the 
political process and the translation of these resources into political influence are not 
considered. It is important to keep in mind that it is not the mere size of material resources, 
but the ability to successfully convert them into advocacy tools, which determine actor-
specific material power (Fuchs 2007, 82). Thus, actors with relatively less material resources 
may be able to exert more power due to the greater fungibility of these resources or the 
pairing of material and ideational power, for instance. 
Next to material power, then, ideational power represents a fundamental dimension of 
power. Looking at the ideational sources of power highlights the symbolic meaning of social 
practices and institutions for the exercise of power and how they enable and constrain 
behavior and action. 
“It is not power in the sense of prevailing in overt conflict, […] or possessing structural 
indispensability. Instead it involves a more subtle and perhaps smaller-scale kind of power than 
any of these – a presence at multiple levels in society and a place in multiple conversations, which 
allows a set of voices to be heard and a set of interests to be taken seriously almost everywhere. 
This is power as a discursive presence.“ (Himmelstein 1997, 143) 
 
A focus on ideational sources of power stresses the normative dimension as a 
nonmaterial power resource and identifies an actor’s ability to influence the framing of 
political issues as a crucial asset, for instance. This “third face of power” (Lukes 2005) points 
to the discursive power an actor can exercise and the definition and framing of policies, actors, 
and of norms and procedures for problem-solving and conflict resolution. In other words, a 
focus on the ideational sources and forms of power turns the focus on actors’ ability to 
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influence discourses, which Hajer defines as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices 
and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995, 44). This 
perspective highlights that via the exercise of discursive power, actors can organize “some 
definitions of issues […] into politics while other definitions are organized out” (Hajer 1995, 
42). In a struggle for discursive hegemony on the meaning of political issues, actors try to 
influence the construction of a prevalent perception and definition and to consolidate selected 
normative assumptions.  
It is difficult to assess the characteristics of this subtle form of power; however, Koller 
traces its exercise through norms, ideas and societal institutions and maps it in culture, 
discourse, and communicative practices (Koller 1991). But since any communication includes 
both intentional and unintentional messages, the recognition and assessment of intent and 
agency becomes particularly difficult. After all, actors are objects as well as subjects in 
discourse (Fuchs 2005). Thus, while (some) norms can be manipulated by actors, others 
structure social relations so deeply that they may shape actors’ identities, perceptions, and 
behavioral options more than the actors are able to shape them. Due to the all-encompassing 
nature of such deep-seated normative structures, they are extremely difficult to challenge. 
Here, Foucault’s notion that the structural power of discourse will gradually materialize seems 
evident (Rabinow 1984). In other words, although norms may form instable ideal factors, 
some deep-seated normative structures are already so internalized that their existence is 
hardly scrutinized. This takes us back to the point that ideational power is a form of power 
that is empirically hard to trace.  
In order to further define material and ideational power for our analysis, it is crucial to 
identify core aspects and determinants of material and ideational power, then. What 
determinants of material and ideational power can we identify and how can they be applied to 
empirical phenomena in global agrifood governance? Material power can be approached via 
an assessment of resources, which may be transformed into influence. Financial means are 
frequently considered an important material source of power, as they are highly fungible and 
can be easily converted into political activities. The more financial means actors have at 
disposal the more it is likely that they will be able to influence politics via lobbying and 
campaign/party finance activities. Financial means not only can allow political influence via 
direct campaign or party donations, but also allow actors to hire professional lobbyists and PR 
consultants or to be present at multiple sites and levels of governance simultaneously, for 
instance. Non-state actors, in particular transnational corporations, have realized that 
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involvement in policy processes is a promising strategy to influence political outcomes and 
have therefore dramatically expanded their political activities. The increasing dependence of 
political decision makers on funding as well as external expertise has improved interest 
groups’ access to politicians and bureaucrats and enhanced the prominence of this aspect of 
actors’ material power (Fuchs 2007). There is a huge gap between different non-state actors 
with regard to the financial means, on which these political activities rely. However, while 
many corporate actors have been able to accumulate huge financial resources, most civil 
society actors tend not to have the same capacities at disposal. 
Besides financial means, market power also forms an important source of material 
power. This power has traditional been described as structural power in IR and International 
Political Economy (IPE) literature. On the one side, market control arising from monopolistic 
or oligopolistic market structures presents a source of material power. In the agrifood sector, 
such structural material power is omnipotent. More than 80 percent of the global markets in 
wheat, corn, coffee, cocoa or tea are each controlled by just three corporations (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002). In the narrow sense, such market control reflects economic power. This 
economic power is translated into political power, however, as soon as market control is 
paired with agenda- or rule-setting activities affecting the wider public. Thus, structural 
material power is reflected in the ability of TNCs to shape political agendas, due to the 
dependence of political elites on the provision of jobs and investments by the private sector. 
This aspect points to the predetermination of the behavioral options of political decision 
makers and leads to the exclusion of certain issues from the political agenda (Fuchs 2007, 58). 
This is linked to the discussion on the decreasing capacity of the state as a consequence of far-
reaching globalization processes; while at the same time, a growing influence of private actors, 
especially globally active corporations, can be observed. It is also reflected in private 
governance initiatives, in which de jure voluntary standards set by agrifood corporations 
become de facto mandatory for suppliers due to the corporations’ market control. 
At the same time, consumers have structural material power in the form of market 
power as well. After all, consumer demand (especially from industrialized countries) can 
shape global economic flows and the associated allocation of value in the global agrifood 
system. This structural power of consumers should not be overestimated, however, as it only 
exists to a notable degree on occasions in which a very large number of consumers share 
preferences and/or act in a similar manner. Only under such conditions may consumers 
challenge the market power of business actors. Moreover, information asymmetries in a 
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global economy based on the distancing of production and consumption, as pointed out above, 
constrain consumer power dramatically. 
In sum, a focus on structural material power points to the often historically fixed 
material structures of global production and consumption processes. Thereby, it sheds light on 
some of the sources of power, on which actors in the global agrifood system can draw. At the 
same time, such a focus also allows the identification of the marginalized and excluded actors 
in the global economy.  
When analyzing ideational power, one of the crucial aspects to consider is authority. 
Following Arendt, we define authority as legitimate force. Along the same lines, Cutler, 
Haufler and Porter conceptualize private authority as “decision-making power over an issue 
area that is generally regarded as legitimate by participants” (Cutler et al. 1999, 362). In other 
words, the question of legitimacy becomes crucial. In IR for instance, Nye’s notion of soft 
power speaks to the ability of military and economically weak states to define policy due to 
their normative authority (Nye 1991). In a similar manner, non-state-centered approaches will 
suggest that actors’ ability to influence discourses is closely linked to perceptions of their 
legitimacy and requires trust in the potential validity of messages. Public actors obtain 
political legitimacy through formal electoral processes, while non-state actors’ legitimacy 
derives from public trust in actor’s expertise and/or willingness to represent the public interest. 
The authority and legitimacy of NGOs, in particular, originates in ideal-type assumptions on 
their non-profit-oriented and non-violent aims (Holzscheiter 2005, 726). But even business 
actors’ political authority has benefited from a public change in attitudes toward market actors 
and increasing public confidence in their problem-solving ability since the rise of 
neoliberalism (Fuchs 2007).4 In addition, business has also actively tried to improve on its 
moral sources of legitimacy with the engagement in and shaping of legitimizing discourses 
such as ‘greening of industry’, ‘corporate citizenship’ or ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
(CSR). At the same time, non-state actors such as NGOs use discursive strategies in the form 
of ‘naming’, ‘framing’, and ‘shaming’ to create pressure and negative publicity in order to 
delegitimize business or public authority (Arts 2003; Holzscheiter 2005). The legitimacy of 
actors and ideas is embedded in social structures. Legitimacy is shaped by discourses and at 
the same time reinforces them in practice. This embeddedness makes legitimacy an especially 
strong determinant of ideational power.  
                                                   
4
 Even in the context of the global financial crisis, trust in business actor’s problem-solving capacity does not seem to 
be decreasing, as their ongoing inclusion as advisors in national rescue plans has shown. 
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Another important dimension of ideational power is knowledge, which refers to the 
processing of information. Including knowledge as a critical determinant of power is to 
question the objectivity of knowledge claims and to include the notion of struggle about truths. 
Paying attention to the social construction of knowledge means recognizing that what is 
perceived as objective knowledge, as fact and truth, and therefore is hardly contested, is 
actually formed and shaped by actors’ communications and the strategic issuance of 
information. Multiple actors are involved in this process and compete for the power of 
interpretation. The complexity of political decisions increasingly requires highly specialized 
knowledge, “and those who control this knowledge have considerable power” (Nelkin 1975, 
37). Policymakers increasingly rely on non-state actors’ specialized knowledge and 
information, which gives them an incentive to involve especially business actors and NGOs in 
the policy making process. Here, they are not only represented on the national level, but are 
also actively involved on the international and supranational level. On the international level, 
for instance, the development process of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety supports the 
case that NGOs and business agents are more and more involved in important political 
negotiations and decision-making together with traditional governmental actors (Bail et al. 
2002). Next to economic and technological information, scientifically based knowledge seems 
to have a strong power of interpretation in the public debate, which results from a generally 
positive perception of scientific expertise and objectivity. At the same time, science pervades 
all aspects of social and political life. Scientific knowledge “embeds and is embedded in 
social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions – in 
short, in all the building blocks that we term the social” (Jasanoff 2004, 3, emphasis in 
original). The readiness to accept expert knowledge and award scientific knowledge extensive 
authority is comparatively high among public and private actors. However, one may want to 
question whether matters concerning science and technology in the decision-making process 
can in fact be apolitical and simply rely on an ‘objective’ specialized knowledge of experts: 
 
“As scientists debate the various sides of political issues, their involvement undermines 
the assumptions about the objectivity of science, and these are precisely the 
assumptions that have given experts their power as the neutral arbiter of truth.” (Nelkin 
as cited in Bocking 2004, 31) 
 
Material and ideational power do not exist independent of each other, but reveal a high 
grade of interaction. Gramscian scholars, in particular, highlight the crucial link between 
material and ideational forms of power. Two pivotal modes of interaction exist: access and 
reconstitution. Access as a mode of interaction manifests itself firstly in organizational terms 
and highlights the ability to gain access to political decision-making bodies. Accordingly, it 
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points to the importance of organizational structures in decision-making bodies and the 
restrictions and access opportunities they offer to actors. The extent to which actors gain 
access to material structures of governance depends on their resources as well as the 
perceived political legitimacy of these actors and their resources. Thus, both material and 
ideational factors influence actors’ access to governance institutions and structures. Next to 
this organizational dimension of access, the question of access to knowledge reveals another 
interaction between material and ideational power. Material sources allow actors to fund 
research, or pay for conferences and publications. Thereby, material sources greatly facilitate 
both the gathering and the communication of knowledge. As knowledge is not an objective 
item, as pointed out above, the ability to determine which questions are being asked and 
which results are being communicated (how), certainly adds to an actor’s power in today’s 
world.  
As a related matter, the issue of reconstitution also reflects the interaction between 
material and ideational sources of power. The success of narratives and storylines can be 
influenced by the repetitiveness, with which corresponding messages are sent. In the era of 
mediatized politics, then, financial resources can be used to strengthen one’s preferred ideas 
and norms or weaken competing ones. PR strategies and media campaigns can often be very 
costly. Consequently, actors with large financial resources have a relative advantage to non-
market actors i.e. business’ financial capacity enables to buy media space and time (Fuchs 
2005). Noelle-Neumann (1996) speaks of the existence of a Schweigespirale in the presence 
of communicative asymmetry. In the past, new telecommunication technologies had been 
expected to lead to greater balance in the abilities of actors to shape public opinion, as these 
technologies allow communication in both directions and carry substantially lower costs. Yet, 
studies show that these new communication channels worldwide are used primarily for 
private economic interests too (Reljić 2001). In this context, one has to ask how public the 
public debate really is. 
In other words, neither the material nor the ideational sources of power should be 
considered just by themselves. There is always an interaction between them. These interaction 
processes may be particularly difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, the reinforcement and 
reconstitution of each other are too important for the shaping of power relations to ignore 
them.  
Consequently, this framework proposes to analyze power relations according to the 
material and ideational dimensions of actors’ power and their interaction on the local and 
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global levels of governance (see table 1). The explanatory power of this framework will be 
illustrated in a next step with the help of the example of GMO politics and more precisely 
‘Golden Rice’ in India. 
 
 
Table 1: Material and ideational determinants of power 
 
Determinants of GMO Politics and ‘Golden Rice’ in India 
Biotechnology in general and agricultural biotechnology in particular are highly 
controversial. Critical observers argue that the genetic modification of crops entails 
unforeseeable environmental and health risks. In contrast, proponents claim that this 
technology represents an opportunity for countries to assure a reliable food supply and, for 
developing countries in particular, to overcome food security problems. Accordingly, 
agricultural biotechnology represents a highly contested policy field, in which a range of 
actors and norms clash. 
The Indian case is particularly interesting for an analysis of GMO politics. India is a 
major producer and exporter of agricultural products as well as facing a huge domestic 
demand for food. Agriculture represents the most important economic sector in the country 
and plays an outstanding role for socio-economic development in the Indian Union. 5 
                                                   
5
 The agricultural sector makes up with 18.6 percent for a large share of India’s GDP (Friedmann 2004), while 
55 percent of its total workforce is employed in agriculture (Millstone and Lang 2008). 
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Moreover, India already is the fourth largest producer of biotech crops, mainly Bt6 cotton, 
planting an area of 7.6 million hectares (James 2008). As a GM crops growing country, India 
has a potential demand and market for further GM technologies and is therefore in the focus 
of seed producers market activities. At the same time, trade barriers related to GMOs, such as 
in the EU, enhance fears that GM crops might destroy India’s export market and global 
market share in agricultural production (Living on Earth Jan 30, 2009 [Air Date]). 
The protracted introduction and heated discussions about the costs and benefits of 
‘Golden Rice’ in India provide an excellent example of political contests around the 
introduction and diffusion of biotechnology in the agricultural sector. ’Golden Rice’ was 
invented in 1999 with the expressed aim of combating malnutrition and especially vitamin A-
deficiency (VAD). It gets its name from the yellow color the provitamin, which has been 
added via genetic engineering, entails. VAD poses a problem in many developing countries 
and the WHO estimates that it causes 250,000-500,000 of vitamin A-deficient children to 
become blind every year and half of them dying within twelve months of losing their sight 
(World Health Organization 2010). In consequence, proponents of ‘Golden Rice’ argue that it 
will enhance health and life expectancy of consumers. Critical scholars and activists, however, 
question the promised health benefits and highlight the safety risks of genetic engineering as 
well as adverse social and economic side-effects associated with a broad introduction of 
‘Golden Rice’.  
‘Golden Rice’ itself provides a particularly interesting example of GMO politics. First, 
the large corporations in control of the global market appear to have no direct economic 
interest in introducing this product to the market. Syngenta and Monsanto, the companies that 
owned the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), which were relevant for the development of 
‘Golden Rice’, have donated their patents to the Golden Rice Humanitarian Project in order to 
allow a ‘Freedom-to-Operate’ for humanitarian purposes in developing countries. Thus, the 
main proponents of ‘Golden Rice’ have been public actors and scientists. 
Secondly, ‘Golden Rice’ has proven to be highly controversial in its introduction and 
represents a case of long and protracted battle in agrifood governance. India as a rice-based 
society with a large agricultural sector, which is already a GMO producing country, could be 
expected to be very interested in this new rice technology. Indeed, India’s state owned 
research labs, the Indian Agricultural Research Institute in New Delhi, the Tamil Nadu 
                                                   
6 Bt stands for the bacteria Bacillus Thuringiensis that is used in the production of the transgene product Bf 
cotton. 
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Agricultural University (TNAU) and Hyderabad-based Directorate of Rice Research, have 
been conducting research on ‘Golden Rice’. But more than a decade after its initial 
intervention, the bio-engineered rice is still not available, despite the corporate donations of 
the IPRs. Furthermore, the director at the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) of the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, S.R. Rao has declared that there are no proposals to carry out 
clinical trials at this moment (Bisserbe Aug 22, 2008). This raises the question, why the 
introduction of ‘Golden Rice’ has been protracted in India? Which actors were involved in 
this political process? How can this development be explained on the basis of the existing 
distribution of material and ideational power? 
As we show below, the case of ‘Golden Rice’ reveals the crucial role ideational 
dimensions of power play in agrifood governance. We do not mean this case to be understood 
as proof that ideational power generally is more important than material power. Rather, we 
have chosen a case emphasizing the role of ideational power because of the traditional focus 
on material power in IR. What the case does show is that under certain conditions material 
power by itself is not sufficient. Before discussing the specifics of the interplay of different 
norms and ideas in this case, however, let us briefly discuss the dimension of material power. 
Typically, an analysis of power politics in GMO governance will point out that the 
global market for GMOs, is characterized by an oligopolistic if not monopolistic market 
structure, i.e. an enormous degree of concentration in control over GMO production and 
distribution.7 Such an analysis would then highlight that the ‘other side’ of GMO politics is 
made up of millions of small farmers. For India specifically, one would also point out that the 
comparatively weak financial situation of these millions of farmers is worsened by the fact 
that the rural poor have little access to credit.8 
However, the distribution of material power between these non-state actors appears to 
be less important in this case. The development of ‘Golden Rice’ did not come from the 
                                                   
7
 Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow and Du Pont are the main corporations in control of the distribution of GM 
crop varieties. Monsanto alone controls 90 percent of global biotech acreage. These multinational corporations 
also play a prominent role in the Indian biotech market. In 2004, three out of ten private-sector companies 
working on GM crop development were foreign multinationals with large biotech portfolios (Newell 2007, 186). 
8
 This is the case even though India holds a wide net of rural finance institutions, due to “inefficiencies in the 
formal finance institutions, the weak regulatory framework, high transaction costs, and risks associated with 
lending to agriculture” (World Bank 2009). Mohan sees the indebtedness of farmers in India directly connected 
to the climate and geographical cultivation structures: “With the intermittent failure of the monsoons and other 
customary vicissitudes of farming, rural indebtedness has been a serious and continuous characteristic of Indian 
agriculture. Because of the high risk inherent in traditional farming activity, the prevalence of high interest rates 
was the norm rather than an exception, and the concomitant exploitation and misery that often resulted“ (Mohan 
2006, 993). 
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private agribiotech sector that dominates the market.9 Rather it has been promoted by public 
actors, including governmental actors, supranational organizations, civil society actors such as 
large foundations, and scientists. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, has invested large 
amounts of money in rice biotechnology research and capacity building (Kryder et al. 2000). 
It has funded the Golden Rice project since the early 1990s and supported it during the entire 
project span. Funding was followed up by other public organizations as the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology (1993-1996), the European Community Biotech Program in its 
‘Carotene Plus’ project (1996-2000) and the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science 
(1996-2000). Today, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is still involved in sponsoring the 
genetic modification of nutritionally enhanced seeds through their ‘Grand Challenges to 
Global Health Initiative’, supporting not only the development of ‘Golden Rice’ but also GM 
cassava, sorghum and bananas with about US$ 36 million (Enserink Apr 25, 2008). Clearly, 
material resources by national and international public actors or civil society actors such as 
transnationally acting foundations can also represent material power in the political process. 
Thus, they could be juxtaposed to the material power resources of the farmers just as 
corporate ones. In the case of ‘Golden Rice,’ however, these material sources are not 
sufficient for explaining the protraction in its adoption. After all, the material power scale is 
highly tilted in favor of the actors promoting the development and introduction of the crop. 
Indeed, the governance of ‘Golden Rice’ is best delineated as a battle of story lines 
(Glaab and Engelkamp 2010). Prominent among these story lines are the ideas of rationality 
or philanthropy, to which especially the proponents of ‘Golden Rice’ refer. The storyline of 
rationality is especially powerful, reflecting the Enlightenment tradition and demonstrating a 
faith in reason and progress. In this story line, agricultural biotechnology is an example of 
modernity and technologically advanced inventions are the foundation of problem-solving 
ability. The story line of rationality generally is a dominant and hegemonic theme in the 
Indian GMO debate. Traditionally, in India, “the concept of science […] is that of the ultimate 
key to all problems facing the country, […] scientists can lay claims to the charisma which in 
some other political cultures belongs exclusively to god-king” (Nandy 1990, 8). The 
declaration of ‘Golden Rice’ as a rational and scientifically based technical solution then is 
supposed to foster the legitimization of its political introduction. In fact, the hegemony of the 
rationality story line is so prevalent that various actors use scientific discourses to legitimize 
                                                   
9 Note that Potrykus, the original inventor, initially approached Nestlé, the world’s biggest food company, for 
funding, who were not interested in the project. Later, Potrykus stated that this rejection was ”fortunate” since it 
allowed public funding for the Golden Rice project (Potrykus 2001).  
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their position: “MNCs, Indian corporates, industry lobbyists, governments, international 
agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and farmers movements all claim 
[…] ’science’ to be on their side“ (Seshia and Scoones 2003, 2). Critics, however, challenge 
the rationalistic view arguing that ‘Golden Rice’ is an indicative of a focus on a ‘technological 
fix’, while existing conventional solutions to vitamin A deficiency are ignored (Greenpeace 
2005; Shiva 2000). 
The story-line of philanthropy is also used by proponents of ‘Golden Rice’ and serves 
to frame the introduction of this GMO crop as a ‘humanitarian’ project and to connect it to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Golden Rice Humanitarian Board 2009). Even 
references to religious symbols such as Potrykus’ meeting with the pope and handing him 
symbolically a print of a research proposal, as well as bible citations in a pro-‘Golden Rice’ 
conference report (“I was hungry and you did not feed me” [Bertebos Foundation 2008]) are 
used to strengthen this story line of Western responsibility for the developing world. Critical 
scholars call it a PR strategy of private and public actors, who have developed creative ways 
to counterbalance their negative perception with moral power and solidarity (Shiva 2001).  
On the other side, these narratives are often challenged with a story line that relates to 
the postcolonial condition. Defined against the history of colonization, ideals such as ‘swaraj’ 
(self-rule) and ‘swadeshi’ (‘of one’s own country’) reactualize imperialism and oppression 
and construct agricultural biotechnology as a threat to Indian identity and the national interest. 
The Gandhian anti-colonialist perspective, for instance, highlights the Indian people’s favor of 
self-sufficiency and suspicion of Western interests. This is highlighted in Indian discourses 
such as “We rears the chickens but who eats the eggs?”, “we are the owners of India, but who 
rules us?” (Assadi 2008), where the postcolonial problem of dependency of the West and of 
large corporations is employed. Using powerful symbols and the story line of India’s colonial 
history, actors are able to keep up a threat from Western control over seeds and their IPRs via 
‘shaming’ and ‘naming’ activities. Although the IPRs of ‘Golden Rice’ have been donated by 
corporations, the story line of postcolonial dependency is still powerfully utilized by actors 
and appeals against the story lines of rationality and philanthropy. 
Connected to these storylines are questions regarding the meaning and role of 
knowledge. Not surprisingly, “there is an ‘asymmetry of knowledge’ between scientists and 
the general public on scientific knowledge and understanding of the technology and its 
functions” (Osgood 2001, 92). Since R&D activities are mainly pursued by private biotech 
firms, most of the individual knowledge about technology development can be found in the 
 17
private sector, while the public sector only marginally generates new knowledge. In contrast 
to this technological knowledge stand the traditional and indigenous knowledge about 
agricultural practices on the regional and local level. Environmental activists like Vandana 
Shiva point out that a multitude of autonomous local food systems exist in India. Importantly, 
the traditional free exchange of seeds among farmers reflects certain knowledge related to 
culture and heritage and is an essential component of Indian people’s livelihoods in rural 
areas (Shiva 2000). There, seeds are often seen as part of a reproductive cyclicality and 
continuity, where seed saving and seed sharing is a common practice and an important aspect 
of traditional agricultural rituals (Gold 2003). These traditional systems of knowledge are 
increasingly challenged by technological innovations and have to struggle against the 
hegemony of modern science. Traditional knowledge and rituals face specialized knowledge 
about genetic modification and scientists perceiving a public ‘subjective’ fear challenging 
their ‘objective truths’ perspective. Which knowledge is preferred against another, then, is 
also closely connected to legitimizing story lines. 
The ideational dimension of the case of ‘Golden Rice’ is not just interesting in terms 
of the current battle of story lines, however. It is also a fascinating case because it shows how 
subtly ideational power can work over the course of time. The ‘Golden Rice’ project itself is 
often described as a strategy of the private sector to enhance its legitimacy and the legitimacy 
of agricultural biotechnology as such. In a foreword to Potrykus and Beyers seminal Science 
article on ‘Golden Rice’, Guerinot stated that “[o]ne can only hope that this application of 
plant genetic engineering to ameliorate human misery without regard to short-term profit will 
restore this technology to political acceptability” (Guerinot 2000, 243). And even Anderson et 
al., who take a positive stance on ‘Golden Rice’ due to its farm productivity gains, suspect 
that Syngenta’s decision to donate its IPRs was a public relations exercise to get more positive 
media coverage of GM food technology (Anderson et al. November 2004, 4). Similarly, 
environmental activists describe the transfer of ‘Golden Rice’ as an effective corporate 
strategy, using the public sector as a “Trojan horse” (Shiva 2001, 19; ETC Group Oct 12, 
2000). The assumption behind that line of argument, as followed by proponents as well as 
opponents, is that once a GMO is accepted, it will be easier to introduce other varieties, too 
(Bisserbe Aug 22, 2008).10 
                                                   
10
 ‘Golden Rice’ may also have been an easy choice for corporate actors in this respect, as its commercial value 
is questionable. Syngenta itself states that it “has no commercial interest in the use of Golden Rice in developing 
countries and does not foresee a commercial market for Golden Rice in developed countries” (Syngenta 
Homepage 2010). 
 18
Even in the interaction with ideational power, material power has failed to shift the 
political tide with respect to ‘Golden Rice’ to its advantage, to date. This interaction plays out 
in the question of access to knowledge as well as in the reconstitution of the public discourse 
on GMOs. Access to knowledge becomes an important issue, when looking at the protection 
of scientific and especially technological knowledge by patents that can cover living 
organisms such as plants, seeds, genes and DNA sequences. Patents restrict access to this 
knowledge to secure benefits from R&D to the inventor or the inventing institution; therefore, 
the development of GMOs in agriculture is always connected to the negotiation of IPRs. 
Today, five major groups of large agribiotech companies control access to most of the 
technology that is needed to do commercial research on GM crops (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2004, 86).11 They can take considerable influence on the availability of GM crops: 
“Because of the breadth of protection accorded to the patent holder (the seed or biotech 
company), concentration in agricultural biotechnology is giving the largest corporations 
unprecedented power vis-à-vis growers and other stakeholders” (UNCTAD Secretariat 2006, 
IV). Consequently, three quarters of all new inventions in agricultural biotechnology are 
controlled by the private sector (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2004, 86).  
‘Golden Rice’ was developed at a public research institute, as pointed out above. 
Nevertheless, according to an IPR audit of the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agribiotech Applications (ISAAA), 12  there were 70 IPRs and Technical Property Rights 
(TPRs) belonging to 32 different companies and universities that were used in experiments 
and needed to be licensed (Kryder et al. 2000; Potrykus 2001, 8). And again, ‘Golden Rice’ 
poses an unusual example in agricultural biotechnology development in so far as a public-
private partnership (PPP) between individuals from universities, public research institutions, 
and the willingness of major multinational corporations to donate licenses offered a solution 
to the IPR problems. Potrykus and Beyer, the original inventors of ‘Golden Rice’, entered a 
partnership with Syngenta (formerly AstraZeneca), which granted Syngenta exclusive rights 
to commercialize the inventions. Syngenta, however, donated all research data, patents and 
legal rights to the humanitarian project, organized in the Golden Rice Humanitarian Board. 
According to the partnership, Syngenta retains all the rights for the commercialization of 
Golden Rice (in the developed world), but seeds are made freely available to farmers and 
                                                   
11 Syngenta, Bayer CropScience, Monsanto, DuPont and Dow AgroSciences. 
12
 The ISAAA terms itself a „not-for-profit international organization that shares the benefits of crop 
biotechnology to various stakeholders, particularly resource-poor farmers in developing countries, through 
knowledge sharing initiatives and the transfer and delivery of proprietary biotechnology applications” 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agribiotech Applications (ISAAA). 
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traders that earn below US$ 10,000 a year (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2004, 37) - a 
strategy that some scholars have termed market segregation (Paul and Steinbrecher Oct 2003). 
Nevertheless, these licenses allow a ‘Freedom-to-Operate’ in developing countries (Al-Babili 
and Beyer 2005, 569). Practically, the Golden Rice Humanitarian Board gives free royalties to 
public research institutions to support the development of locally adapted varieties in 
developing countries such as China, India or Bangladesh (Allen 2005).  
Even if there seems to be no direct commercial interests at play here (at least on the 
surface), the concept of patenting and restrictions in access to knowledge already represents 
an important link between material and ideational dimensions of power. Shiva for instance 
highlights the marginalization of indigenous knowledge structures: “In central India […] at 
the beginning of the agricultural season, farmers gather before the village deity, offer the rice 
varieties, and then share the seeds. This annual festival of Akti rejuvenates the duty of saving 
and sharing seed among farming communities” (Shiva 2001, 14). The tradition of sharing 
seeds stands in direct conflict with IPR protected rice varieties. Although ‘Golden Rice’ is 
supposed to become freely available and knowledge of the technology can be exchanged, the 
question remains if it can be that easily introduced into a context, where local seed cultivation 
and access to this knowledge has a long tradition. Clearly, with respect to the development of 
GMOs, financial resources and knowledge production are closely connected, as are market 
power and knowledge with respect to the use of GMOs. This interaction between material and 
ideational power, however, does not only provide a potential source of power but also can 
serve to raise the legitimacy challenges faced by GMO technology. 
The second important interaction between material and ideational sources of power 
can be witnessed in the discursive battle for the hearts and minds of the Indian public and 
especially farmers. Specifically, economically strong actors have been able to invest into PR 
strategies to enhance their legitimacy. Thus, the promoters of ‘Golden Rice’ have pursued far-
reaching media campaigns that enabled them to disseminate a legitimizing discourse of 
humanitarian necessity and urgency, and to advocate it as a rational scientific solution to a 
global problem. While NGOs and Indian activist networks tend not have the same financial 
means as corporations or governments, their perceived legitimacy has helped them gain a 
strong voice in the public and political debate. Actors such as Greenpeace, Action Group on 
Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group) and GM critically scientists have been 
able to challenge the proposed benefits of ‘Golden Rice’ and introduce a strong critical 
account of it.  
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In sum, the long battle over the adoption of ‘Golden Rice’ in India can best be 
understood on the basis of the ideational contests associated with it. To date, the promotion of 
rationality and philanthropy discourses has not been able to overcome traditional societal 
values and knowledge structures. As this case shows then, material power may well be 
impotent in the context of issues associated with high levels of conflict over legitimacy claims. 
 
Conclusion 
These notes on the political processes connected to the introduction of ‘Golden Rice’ 
in India serve as an illustration of the proposed framework of material and ideational power to 
assess global and local forces in India’s agricultural biotechnology sector. They reveal a 
strong role of ideational dimensions of power in this case of agrifood governance. Specifically, 
the analysis has shown that the protracted introduction of ‘Golden Rice’ into India is 
connected to a battle between different norms and story lines. Although proponents of 
‘Golden Rice’ have a preeminent position when it comes to material power, they have not 
been able to convert it fully into political power due to their relative legitimacy deficit. Even 
the donation of the patents by the GMO corporations has not served to change the overall 
legitimacy challenges faced by agricultural biotechnology and its prominent actors. Further 
developments in this case will be interesting to watch. After all, ‘Golden Rice’ might come to 
play an important part in legitimizing the diffusion of GMO technology. The connection of 
the rationality with the philanthropy story lines has potentially enormous discursive power. 
Pointing to the strong role of ideational forces, our framework enables us to analyze 
the formation and the relation of power in a differentiated manner. (Again, this is a special 
case, and we do not mean to suggest that material power generally is less important than 
ideational power in global agrifood governance. Rather, we show that ideational power plays 
a crucial role under conditions of contested legitimacy claims.) Scientifically, such a 
differentiated concept of power provides better insights into the overall picture of power 
relations and the generation of political outcomes. Moreover, a better understanding of how 
material and ideational, global and local forces interact and how power is exercised opens 
possibilities for politics to establish fitting checks and balances in a policy field, which is 
difficult to govern. In sum, a deeper knowledge on power relations in the global agrifood 
system allows a more systematic assessment of policy options and an opportunity for politics 
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